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HARVARD LAW REVIEW
expectations of succeeding decades, seek out divergences we now as-
sume to have been always present. It may be useful, for purposes of
history it is still too soon to write, to suspend those expectations. We
rightly celebrate John Ely and his work here. We may also want to
recall the uncommon bustle of the place and time within which much
of that work was done.
Henry Paul Monaghan*
John Ely: The Harvard Years
John Ely's life ended too soon, on October 25, a few weeks before
his sixty-fifth birthday. Six months earlier, Yale had awarded him an
honorary Doctor of Laws. The citation accompanying the award
stated, "Your work set the standard for constitutional scholarship for
our generation." It is, I believe, particularly appropriate that this Law
Review dedicate an issue to John's memory. John taught at Harvard
Law School from 1973 to 1982. During that time he produced his sig-
nature work, Democracy and Distrust,' and the articles most closely
associated with his name, several of which appeared in this Review.
I met John shortly after his arrival at Harvard Law School, at a fo-
rum on Roe v. Wade.2 We argued that Roe was an abuse of judicial
power, not because the decision conflicted with our ideas of progress
but because nothing in the text, structure, or history of the Constitu-
tion suggested that the abortion issue fell within the Court's domain.
Moreover, no metric existed by which the Court could resolve abor-
tion-related issues in a principled way. (As John later wrote, Roe "is
not constitutional law and gives almost no sense of an obligation to try
to be."3) From that point on we saw a good deal of one another.
I lack the literary skills of a biographer necessary adequately to de-
scribe John's personality. John was quite proud of his considerable
academic achievements, but he wore the marks of success quietly. He
was private and wholly unassuming in manner. Endowed with a gen-
tle and playful wit, he greatly enjoyed good humor. In his judgments,
* Harlan Fiske Stone Professor of Constitutional Law, Columbia Law School.
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(i98o).
2 410 U.S. I3 (1973).




John was eminently fair and dispassionate - I never heard him char-
acterize anyone or any work in pejorative or dismissive terms. John
took great pleasure in and was intensely loyal to his friends, and
greatly valued the lifelong friendships he made while at Harvard.
John's nonlegal interests were wide-ranging, extending from philoso-
phy, literature, music, and ballet, to sports and scuba diving. Finally,
John had his faults, of course. As his friends well know, on his very
best days John was not long on patience.
John was a particularly gifted writer, and his prose sparkled with
his gentle wit. One reason that Democracy and Distrust is so success-
ful is that its important points are made with both wit and eloquence.
Consistent with his character, however, that wit was never employed
at anybody else's expense. John's years at Harvard were productive
ones. Several of his articles were incorporated into Democracy and
Distrust. In addition, this Review published two other articles of en-
during importance. One dealt with an important methodological ques-
tion of First Amendment jurisprudence: how should the Court treat
legislation not directed at protected speech but that nonetheless in-
cludes some speech within the general statutory prohibition? 4  In such
situations, John argued that a meaningful balancing test should be
employed. John also wrote my favorite article, an outstanding exami-
nation of the "Erie problem." While the topic is too complex to pursue
in detail here, John challenged the embedded Harvard Law School or-
thodoxy as mistaken in important aspects. 5
John's most significant work was, of course, Democracy and Dis-
trust, published in 1980. This is the single most cited work on consti-
tutional law in the last century.6 It is and will remain for a very long
time to come a rite of passage for all those who hope to do serious
work in the field of constitutional law.
4 John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balanc-
ing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1975) (assessing the famous draft card
desecration case, United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)).
5 John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REv. 693 (1974). The en-
trenched wisdom was that Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), required the federal
courts to apply state substantive law whenever state law was applicable ex proprio vigore. How
to define "substantive" became the bone of contention. Compare Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326
U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (Frankfurter, J.) (defining state rules as substantive when they "determine the
outcome of litigation"), with HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, 659-60, 678 (1953) (articulating the orthodox view that
state rules are substantive when they affect "primary private activity"). Chief Justice Warren's
opinion in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), rejected both Frankfurter's and Hart's frame-
work when the validity of a federal statute or rule was involved. John was Warren's clerk at the
time. Further, your deponent sayeth not.




Democracy and Distrust analyzes American constitutional law
through the lens of democratic political theory, not history-based
originalism. Essentially, Democracy and Distrust is two books. Book
One (Chapter 3) is a sustained attack on fundamental rights theory -
that is, upon judicial and academic efforts to fashion fundamental in-
terests that are not grounded in the constitutional text, history, or
structure. John's attack on Roe v. Wade was the precursor to his
Foreword in this Review entitled On Discovering Fundamental Values,
which in turn constituted his argument in Democracy and Distrust.
His fundamental point was that, in their open-ended efforts to dis-
cover non-textually based fundamental values somewhere "out there"7
(for example, in reason, natural law, consensus, or tradition), judges
embark upon little more than a voyage of self-discovery, "whether or
not [they are] fully aware of it."" This line of criticism drew inspira-
tion from John's strong grounding in British empirical philosophy; in-
deed, Chapter 3 reads as though it were penned by David Hume.
John's attack on fundamental rights theory is, I believe, the finest
piece he ever wrote. But that part of Democracy and Distrust has
been overshadowed by the remainder of the book. Democracy and
Distrust defended an important affirmative judicial role in constitu-
tional adjudication: courts, he argued, had a legitimate and important
role in reinforcing the Constitution's democratic aspects in order to en-
sure effective access and representation to minorities previously ex-
cluded from effective participation in the political process. John de-
veloped this "representation-reinforcing" conception of judicial review
by examining impermissible barriers to voting and political speech.
His final chapter, Facilitating the Representation of Minorities, ex-
tended his analysis into the legislative process itself, the area of suspect
classifications. There, he tried to develop the full implications of a
principle that classifications discriminating against minorities justifia-
bly bore a heavy burden of justification. That analysis, of course, is
widely understood as the classic exposition of the Carolene Products
footnote.9
The Harvard years were professionally happy ones for John. But
he had a restless streak. While at Harvard, he took a year's leave to
serve as general counsel to the Department of Transportation. After
publishing Democracy and Distrust, John felt the need for a new chal-
lenge. Two choices were available: dean of Stanford Law School, or
(temporarily, of course) a detective in a California police department.
John took the former opportunity and served as Stanford's dean from
7 ELY, supra note i, at 48.
8 Id. at 44.
9 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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1982 to 1987. In 1996, he moved to the University of Miami, where he
served as Hausler Professor of Law. There, for several reasons, his
restlessness ceased.
While at Stanford, John developed a strong interest in war-power
issues, and he wrote extensively on that topic.' 0 He decried both presi-
dential warmaking power and Congress's refusal to discharge its war-
making responsibilities. At Miami, John expanded his earlier interest
in voting, and he wrote several essays on that topic.1 Continuing
from an article he wrote at Harvard that defended race-based af-
firmative action programs,' 2 John insisted that affirmative action
programs could be justified only on the premise that the political proc-
ess itself was free of racial gerrymandering. 13
John's early death ended a career, but his intellectual legacy will go
on. What will not go on, save in memories, is the warmth and pleas-
ure he brought to the lives of his family and friends.
Richard D. Parker*
John, Fred, and Ginger
His office was at the opposite end of the hall from mine. I was
new. And I didn't know him well. But we both worked nights. Of-
ten, we were the only ones on the hall. We left our doors open. John
tended to talk to himself - loudly. Usually, mumbling and muttering.
Sometimes, outbursts. One night, what I heard made me get up and
go down there. He had proclaimed - proclaimed ecstatically: "Yes,
Yes, Yes, Yes, Yes." I said something to him about Molly Bloom. He
laughed. (His laugh was a guffaw from deep inside, an authentic hap-
piness.) He was writing.
John was a writer. Of course, he was a lot more. In fact, I can see
the grumpy look with which he might react to any idea that he was
10 See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS
OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH (1993).
11 See, e.g., John Hart Ely, Standing To Challenge Pro-Minority Gerrymanders, iii HARV. L.
REV. 576 (1997).
12 John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV.
723 (1974).
13 John Hart Ely, Confounded by Cromartie: Are Racial Stereotypes Now Acceptable Across
the Board or Only When Used in Support of Partisan Gerrymanders?, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 489
(2002). This was John's last article, and the writing is vintage Ely: elegant, witty, and incisive.
* Williams Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
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